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upon its draftsmen. The few serious problems of interpretation which have
arisen have been due not so much to defects in the Act as to the Janus-like
attitude of the courts in their struggles to reconcile the legislative fiat that
the United States shall no longer be immune to suit in tort with the ancient
doctrine that "no suit or action can be brought against the King, even in
civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over Him." 170 The
district courts, especially, have evidenced a general reluctance to depart
from the clearly defined paths of the common law doctrine and to create
their own precedents. But with the passage of time they ceased to be
disquieted by the spectacle of their Government standing before the bar as a
defendant in a tort suit and settled down to an impartial application of the
Act to the merits of each case. An excellent example of this process is
furnished by the so-called subrogation cases.
The Act has received a substantially uniform construction and where
there have been clear divergencies between the circuit courts the Supreme
Court has not hesitated to grant certiorari and resolve the conflict. There
remain only two such divergencies. These involve the rights of armed
forces personnel with respect to service-connected injuries and the procedural-substantive question as to whether the United States and individuals
may be joined as party defendants. It is contemplated that the Supreme
Court will dispose of the former in the near future."1 The latter problem
poses so many diverse questions of both procedural and substantive rights
that no one case could dispose of them all. The only adequate remedy
would seem to be a legislative pronouncement by way of amendment.
No discussion of the Act would be complete without the now classic
statement of Judge Cardozo: "The exemption of the sovereign from suit
involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not
to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been
announced." 172 To this can be added only the73 venerable maxim: Lex non
exacte definit, sed arbitrioboni yiri permittit.1
R. F. M.

Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms: State and
Federal Firearms Legislation
"No one shall come before the justices, or go, or ride armed," commanded the Statute of Northumberland, enacted in 1328.1 Firearms had
not yet been introduced into the British Isles, but it was already considered necessary to prohibit the carrying of weapons in public places, to encourage peaceful behavior. The development of society toward the concept
of community sanctions for dangerous acts, i.e., punishment for crime, and
the correlative concern for diminishing the frequency of antisocial acts, i.e.,
prevention of crime and accidents, are twin impetuses behind legislation
regulating the use of weapons. Firearms represent the chief danger. The
affirmative side of the use of firearms by the private citizen is substantial.
170. 1 BL. Comms. *242.
171. Certiorari has been granted in the Feres and Jefferson cases, notes 79, 80
supra.
172. Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 30
(1926).
173. "The law does not define exactly but trusts in the judgment of a good man."
1. 1328, 2 Edw. III, c. 3; Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B.

1686).
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Hunting and target-shooting are popular and wholesome recreations and
greatly deserve all possible encouragement. Furthermore, there is still
much need for self-help, especially against robbery and burglary.
It is also true that a valuable military asset lies in the reservoir of persons trained to use small arms. In colonial days and during the Revolutionary War, the Continental riflemen displayed considerable skill as militia, and impressed upon political thought the value of a citizenry armed
to defend itself against oppression. This idea found powerful expression
as a guarantee of last resort in the Second Amendment, 2 and in similar
provisions in state constitutions. Yet viewed as a right to rebellion, this
right to bear arms would seem to be no longer effective against an oppressive government controlling instruments of modern warfare. On the other
hand, although no longer a nation of "embattl'd farmers", we can expect
the citizen skilled in the handling of small arms to form the cadre and the
core around which a modem army may be built to resist any external oppression.
The problem of firearms regulation, therefore, is to achieve a maximum
degree of control over criminal and careless uses without destroying the
practical availability of firearms to the hunter, sportsman, farmer, and
person in need of protection. It has been the general rule in legislation to
allow the larger weapons, rifles and shotguns, a very high degree of freedom of use and transfer; 2a easily concealed weapons such as pistols, on the
other hand, are often regulated very restrictively. Such a dichotomy preserves to the majority of sportsmen and farmers their use of firearms with
little or no regulation. The division point is often made at a barrel length
of less than twelve inches.3 There are, however, a few larger weapons
whose use is almost entirely criminal, such as the submachine gun. These
have been the subject of effective special legislation. Unless specifically
indicated, the discussion of "firearms" legislation will pertain to pistols and
revolvers which are the usual subjects of restriction.
STATE LEGISLATION

In frontier days, the carrying of weapons was imperative, for hunting,
and for protection against dangerous animals and hostile savages; accordingly, neither the practicality nor necessity of regulation arose until the stabilization of population in towns and cities occurred. 4 Early state legislation
met with some constitutional obstacles. Although the Second Amendment
was interpreted to limit only the powers of the Federal Government, 5 similar
state constitutional provisions were in effect.0 Thus, Kentucky's statute
of 1813, the first to forbid the carrying of concealed weapons, was held
2. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the

right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."

U.S. CONST.

AMEND. II.

2a. Florida requires a license for repeating rifles, FLA. STAT., § 790.05 (1941);
West Virginia also requires a license for high velocity rifles, W. VA. CoDE ANN.,
§6050 (1949).
3. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4736 (Burns, 1933); OaE. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 25-113 (1940).

4. Among the first statutes to regulate the carrying of weapons in the United

States was the pre-revolutionary Criminal Code of the Province of Massachusetts, c.
18, § 6, forbidding the carrying of offensive weapons in public places. This statute
was re-enacted after the American Revolution, 2 MAss. LAws 1780-1800, § 653.
5. The Second Amendment is a limitation on the powers of the Federal Government, but not on the states. See United States v. Cruickchank, 92 U.S. 542, 553
(1875).
6. McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 12 MARQ. L. Rv. 138 (1928).
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repugnant to the state constitutional provision that "the right of the citizens
to bear arms . . . shall not be questioned."

A Georgia statute of

1837, forbidding the possession, sale or carrying of any but horseman's pistols, was struck down as applied to the open carrying of weapons but sustained as a reasonable exercise of the police power when applied to concealed carrying.8 Similar statutes, early adopted in Indiana and Arkansas,
were sustained as applied to concealed weapons.9
Every state now recognizes, however, that some degree of firearms
regulation is constitutionally permissible 'o and most states have enacted
progressively more restrictive legislation. These statutes regulate possession, carrying, purchase, sale, and pledging of firearms.
Possession of Firearins.-OnlyNew York State requires all citizens
to procure a license to keep a firearm on their own premises or in a place
of business." The strictness of the New York statute may be explained
in part by the police problem existing in New York City of controlling a
very large and dense population, differing greatly in racial and national
backgrounds, highly mobile and relatively rootless in both a social and
physical sense. Such a licensing requirement cannot be enforced economically, and in all probability the number of criminals whose arrest is made
possible by this statute is small compared with the burden placed on those
with proper reasons for wishing to have firearms in their homes or places
of business.
The only other states besides New York which impose general restrictions on the possession of firearms by reputable citizens on their own
property are Michigan and Mississippi. In Michigan the statute provides
that all firearms must be inspected by local peace officers as a safety measure, but without registration. 12 Its adequacy as a safety measure is questionable, since few peace officers are possessed of either the skill or equipnent necessary to make the most elementary safety examinations. In Mississippi the statute provides for registration of all weapons except shotguns.' 3
It is worded as a civilian defense measure, although the possibility of invasion of the state of Mississippi seems rather remote. Furthermore, if
Mississippi should ever be invaded these civilian weapons, because of the
7. Ky. Acts 1812-13, c. 89; held unconstitutional in Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2
Litt. 90 (Ky. 1822). The Kentucky Constitution was later amended, Ky. CoNsT.
ART. XIII, § 25 (1850), and statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons
sustained; Ky. REV. STAT. v. I, p. 414 (Stanton 1860), Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 3
Bush. 480 (Ky. 1868).
8. Ga. Laws 1837, p. 90; sustained as to concealed weapons only, Nunn v. State,
1 Ga. 243 (1846).
9. Ind. Laws 1819, c. 23; ARK. REv. STAT., c. 44, div. 8, art. I, § 13 (1837).
10. State courts have held the state constitutional provisions to mean collective
and not individual rights, e.g., State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840) ; State v. Buzzard, 4
Ark. 18 (1859) ; or that reasonable limitations under the police power were valid, e.g.,
Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874) ; Salina v. Blacksley, 72 Kan. 230, 83 Pac. 619 (1905).
For a collection of state constitutional provisions, see McKenna, The Right to Keep
and Bear Arins, 12 MAXtQ. L. REv. 138 (1928).
11. N.Y. PENAL CODE, § 1897(4) ; sustained in People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 97
N.E. 877 (1912).
12. MICH. STAT. ANN., § 28.97 (Henderson, 1938).
13. Miss. CODE ANN., §§ 8623 to 8630 (Supp. 1948).
14. Aliens: e.g., CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 247 (1935); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1008
(1943). Felons: e.g., N.H. REv. LAws c. 179, § 3 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:176-8
(1940). Incompetents: NEB. REv. STAT. § 37-204 (1943); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4492
(Williams, 1934). Minors: ME. REv. STAT. c. 125, § 9 (1944) ; MINN. STAT. § 615.10
(Henderson 1945). Drug addicts and drug peddlers: CAL. GEN. LAws act 1970,
§ 2(c) (1944); N.D. REv. CODE § 62-0104(2) (1934).
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various types of ammunition and spare parts necessary, would obviously be
of little use to an organized military force; the measure has its chief utility
in providing a police record of the ownership of weapons.
Most other states impose restrictions upon the possession of firearms
by such categories as aliens, persons who have been convicted of a felony,
incompetents, minors, drug addicts, and drug peddlers. 4 These classes are
not uniformly defined in the various statutes, nor do all states treat them
alike.
The view point of the majority of the states that a reputable citizen
should be allowed to possess a firearm on his own premises would seem to
be sound both because of the difficulty of enforcement and the burden upon
owners. Furthermore, viewed as a civil defense measure, registration of
all weapons is especially undesirable because these records falling into
the hands of an occupying force, would provide an easy means to disarm
potential civilian opposition.
Carrying of Firearms.-Although most states allow the reputable
adult citizen to carry a firearm, they differ as to whether it may be carried
openly or concealed, and with or without a license. All states permit peace
officers, military personnel, and civilians in various occupational groups to
carry firearms while on duty or in the course of their employment. 15 In
two, Minnesota and Vermont, firearms may be carried openly or concealed
so long as there is no intent to injure another.'8 Idaho and Nevada restrict
only the carrying of concealed firearms in towns.' 7 Seventeen states make
a license mandatory if the firearm is carried concealed, but have no standard
statewide restrictions if carried openly.'8 Again, seven states and the District of Columbia allow firearms, whether carried openly or concealed, to
be carried only with a license.' 9 Twelve other states do not allow a firearm
2
to be carried concealed, but do not require a license if carried openly. 0
Georgia also does not permit concealed carrying, but makes it mandatory
to have a license to carry a firearm openly.2 ' Missouri does not allow the
E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4501 (1947); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2081 (194-).
MINN. STAT., § 616.41 (Henderson, 1945); VT. REV. STAT., § 8274 (1947).
IDAHo CODE, § 18-3302 (1947) ; NEV. ComP. LAws ANN., § 10251 (1929).
ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 175 (1940) ; CAL. GEN. LAWS, act 1970, § 5 (1944) ; COLO.
STAT. ANN., c. 48, § 245 (1935) ; IOWA CODE, § 695.2 (1946) ; ME. REv. STAT., c. 124,
§ 18 (1944); MICH. STAT. ANN., § 28.93 (Henderson, Supp. 1949); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN., § 94-3525 (1947) ; N.H. REv. LAwS, C. 179, § 4 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN.,
§ 2:176-41 (1940); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN., § 25-115 (Supp. 1943); PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 18, § 4628(e) (Purdon, 1945); R-I. GEN. LAWS, c. 404, § 4 (1938); S.D. CODE
§ 21.0105 '(1939); UTAH CODE ANN., § 103-21-3 (1943) ; VA. CODE ANN., § 18-146
(1950) ; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN., § 2516-5 (Supp. 1940).
Many states have general statutes allowing additional firearms regulation by
cities, towns and municipalities. E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-425, 14-430,
15-436 (1935); OKLA. STAT., tit. 11, § 667 (1941).
19. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4166 (1949); D.C. CODE § 22-3204 (Supp. 1949); FLA.
STAT. § 790.01 (1941); IND. ANN. STAT., § 10-4736 (Bums 1933); MASS. ANN.
LAWS, c. 269, § 10 (Supp. 1949); N.Y. PENAL CODE, § 1897(5); N.D. REV. CODE,
§ 62-0105 (1943) ; W.VA. CODE ANN., § 6043 (1949).
20. ARIZ. CODE ANN., § 43-2204 (1939); ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 38, § 155 (1935);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §-21-2411 (1935); Ky. REv. STAT., §230 (1948); LA.
CODE CRIm. LAW & PROC. ANN., §740-95 (1943); MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 27, §40
(1939) (forbidding open carrying only with intent to injure); Miss. CODE ANN.,
§ 2079 (1942) ; NEB. REv. STAT., § 28-1001 (1943) ; N.C. Session Laws 1949. c. 1217,
§ 1; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN., § 12817 (1938); Wis. STAT., § 340.69 (1947); Wyo.
CoMP. STAT. ANN., § 9-1203 (1945) (forbidding open carrying only with intent to
injure).
21. GA. CODE ANN., §§ 265101, 265103 (1933)
15.
16.
17.
18.
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carrying of a firearm in certain specified places, New Mexico in settlements.2 2 Arkansas and Tennessee do not allow firearms to be carried concealed, nor openly with one exception.2 Finally, Oklahoma, South Carolina
and Texas
do not permit the carrying of firearms either openly or con24
cealed.

This lack of uniformity may cause considerable embarrassment and
inconvenience to travellers and sportsmen legally carrying firearms in their
own states, who may cross state lines. Many states make no provision for
such situations, perhaps relying on the discretion of local officers.2 5 Those
states which do provide for interstate travel employ early statutes intended
for those who needed safeguards on the highway.2 6 The redrafting of
existing statutes to make the law of the domicile applicable to interstate
travellers would eliminate this problem. In those states which prohibit the
carrying of concealed weapons, the problem of the out-of-state traveller is
paralleled by situations involving citizens of the state whose need for firearms is not recognized by the inflexible statute, with its rigid categories of
exceptions. Such a situation forces police officials to make discretionary
adjustments outside the statute, and places reputable citizens in a highly
uncertain position.
License to Carry.-Where the individual is permitted to carry firearms
either openly or concealed, it is usually required that he obtain a license
27
from some designated authority in accordance with a statutory procedure.
The general statutory scheme has been to designate an existing police, administrative, or judicial authority as the licensing agency, and to require
that the applicant satisfy the authority as to his age, good character, and
reasons for wanting to carry a firearm. 28 Although some investigation or
22. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN., § 4423 (1939); N.M. STAT. ANN., §41-1702 (1941).
23. ARx. STAT. ANN., § 41-4501 (1947); TENN. CODE ANN., § 11007 (Williams,
1934). Both states allow army and navy pistols only to be carried openly.
24. O LA. STAT., tit. 21, §§ 1271, 1272 (1941); S.C. CODE ANN., §§ 1255, 1256
(1941); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN., Art. 483 (Vernon, 1925).
25. E.g., Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina and
Tennessee.
26. Statutes of some states expressly exempt travellers. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.,
§41-4501 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN., §2081 (1942); N.M. STAT. ANN., §41-1708
(1941).
27. A.A. CODE ANN., tit. 14, § 177 (1940); CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 1970, § 8
(Supp. 1947); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, § 245 (1935); CONN. GEN. STAT., §§ 41584161 (1949); Dr.. REv. CODE, §5287 (1935); D.C. CODE, §22-3206 (1940); FLA.
STAT., § 790.06 (1941); GA. CODE ANN., § 26-5104 (1933); IDAHO CODE ANN.,
§ 18-3302(5) (1947); IND. ANN. STAT., § 10-4738 (Bums, Supp. 1949); IoWA CODE,
§§ 695.4-695.17 (1946); ME. Rmv. STAT., C. 125, § 18 (1944); MAss. ANN. LAWs,

c. 140, § 113 (1933);

MIcH. STAT. ANN., § 28.93 (Henderson, Supp. 1949); MONT.
REv. CODE ANN.,
94-3529 (1947); NEv. ComP. LAWS ANN., § 10251 (1929);
N.H. R.v. LAws, C. 179, § 6 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN., § 2:176-44 (Supp. 1949);
N.Y. PENAL CODE, § 1897(9)-(14); N.D. REV. CODE, § 62-0105 to 62-0108 (1943);
Ore. Laws 1947, c. 378, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4628(f) (Purdon, 1945);

LAWS, c. 404, § 6 (1938); S.D. CODE, § 21.0107 (1939); UTAH CODE
§103-21-4 (1943); VA. CODE ANN., §4534 (1942); WASH. REv. STAT.
ANN., § 2516-7 (Supp. 1940); W. VA. CODE ANN., § 8-715 (1950).
28. Police, administrative, or judicial: Alabama, South Dakota, Washington;
Police or judicial: North Dakota; Police or administrative: Colorado, New Hamp-

R.I.

GEN.

ANN.,

shire; Police: California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine,
New York (except New York City), Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island; Tudicial:
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Montana, New York (except New York City), Utah
(justice of the peace), Virginia, West Virginia. Addministrative: Florida, Nevada.
Michigan has a Board made up of county prosecutor, sheriff and commissioner of
public safety, or their deputies. New Jersey provides for application and approval
by local police and then approval by the court. For statutory references to various
state laws, see note 27 supra.
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assurance other than the affidavit of the applicant is usually provided for,29
many of the licensing agencies are unsuited to carry out thorough investigations. All of the states requiring licenses set up recording systems varying
in complexity from the New York statute, which includes fingerprinting and
the filing of much detailed information with several offices, to that of Utah,
which requires only that the local sheriff keep a record book. 30 The cost
of the license is generally a nominal sum sufficient only to pay the necessary
administrative expenses involved. West Virginia, however, requires the
applicant to pay a license fee of twenty dollars and to post a bond in the
amount of thirty-five hundred dollars to be used to indemnify any person
damaged by the licensee's use of a firearm. 31 Licenses are generally issued
for one year only,32 must be carried with the
33 weapon, and must be produced
upon demand by a law enforcement officer.
Proper regulation of the carrying of easily concealed firearms, which
are favored by criminals, seems desirable. To be effective as an anti-crime
measure, however, a licensing statute should provide opportunity and facilities for thorough investigation of the potential licensee. Following the
filing of an application by the licensee containing fingerprints and all facts
material to the issuance of a license, state and local police should be consulted, with a check of state and federal files to determine whether the applicant has a criminal record. The information obtained should then be
turned over to local boards, consisting of a representative of the county
prosecutor, the sheriff, and the commissioner of public safety. Such a
system is used by Michigan.3 4 Target-shooters and sportsmen should be
taken care of under a special license, such as that of Section 9 of the Uniform Pistol Act,3 5 which is easy to procure, but restricts its holder to the
carrying of a bag or parcel containing a pistol with a barrel of six or more
inches or a .45 calibre automatic. A personal interview of the licensee
should be included, and the decision, left to the discretion of the board,
should be based on a showing by the applicant that the carrying of a firearm
is necessary to his legitimate occupation, or that he has reasonable basis for
fear of injury to life and property. The cost of the license should be just
sufficient to cover administrative expenses. The license itself should run
for about three years, subject to revocation for cause, such as conviction of
a crime of violence or felony, or termination of the occupation which justified the original issuance. Statutory provision for an inexpensive and con29. DEL.. REV. CODE, § 236 (1935)
(certificate of five reputable freeholders,
publish notice of application, judicial hearing) ; D.C. CODE, § 22-3206 (1940) (photograph) ; FLA. STAT., § 790.06 (1941) ($100 bond) ; GA. CODE ANN., § 26-5104 (1933)
($100 bond) ; IowA CODE, § 695.5 (1946) (applicant must appear personally) ; MIcE.
STAT. ANN., § 28.93 (Henderson, Supp. 1949) (fingerprints); N.J. STAT. ANN.,
§ 2-176:44 (1940) (fingerprints) ; N.Y. PENAL CODE, § 1897 (10) (photograph,

fingerprints) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS, c. 404, § 6 (1938) (fingerprints, $300 bond) ; W. VA.
CODE, § 6044 (1949) (publish notice of application, $3,500 bond).
30. N.Y. PENAL CODE, § 1897 (9-10) (Supp. 1949); UTAH CODE ANN., § 103-

21-4 (1943).
31. W. VA. CODE ANN., § 6044 (1949).
32. This is true of all states except Georgia and Iowa.
33. Although provided for by most of the states that require licenses, it was
omitted by oversight from the UNIFORm FiREARms Acr, 9 UNIFORm LAws ANN. 582
(1940).
This error was rectified in the UNIFORm PISTOL Acr, 9 UNIFoRm LAWS

ANN. 581 (1940).
34. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.93 (Henderson, Supp. 1949).
35. 9 UNiroaa

LAWS ANN. 584 (1942).
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venient method of limited appeal from an adverse ruling should be included.
Such a procedure is presently available in Pennsylvania. 36
The benefits of licensing statutes are apparent. The threat of arrest,
or actual arrest, discourages promiscuous carrying of firearms, which may
result in violence when passions are aroused. Criminals are also less likely
to carry firearms, especially since the police may arrest and convict a known
criminal on the lesser charge of illegally carrying a firearm, when evidence
of other crimes is lacking.3 7
Permit to Purchase.-A few states require the obtaining of a permit
to purchase, or the possession of a license to carry, as a prerequisite to the
purchase of a firearm 38 Along this line, Texas requires a certificate of
good character from the judge of the county of residence, and New Hampshire a permit only for felons and aliens.39 Such laws are largely ineffective
so long as firearms may be purchased in neighboring states without a
permit.40 Many states rely on a permit of sale, requiring the same information and procedure, to accomplish this purpose. This is the device adopted
by the Uniform Firearms Act.41 The recent Uniform Pistol Act, which
42
has not been enacted by any state, contains restrictions upon purchase.
The permit to sell is to be preferred to the permit to purchase because
it places the responsibility on the dealer, who, because of a large fixed
investment, will probably be more zealous in complying with the law than
the individual applicant. It should be recognized, however, that the great
reservoir of firearms in private hands, together with bootlegged, stolen, and
illegally manufactured weapons, provides a plentiful source of supply for
criminals which such laws cannot reach.
Restrictions on the Sale of Firearms.-Restrictions on the sale of firearms are of two types: those which regulate the right to sell, and those
which regulate in what manner and to what persons a sale shall be made.
Although most states impose no restrictions on the right to sell, 43 a minority
44
require dealers to acquire either a license to sell from a designated official,
36. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4628(k) (Purdon, 1945) (appeal to Court of
Common Pleas from adverse decision of issuing authority).
37. Barber-Smith, Firearms Regulation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 400, 402

(1934).

38. MAss. ANN. LAWS, C. 140, § 131(a) (Supp. 1948) ; MICH. STAT. ANN., § 28.92
(Henderson, Supp. 1949); Mo. RIv. STAT. ANN., § 4826 (1939); N.J. STAT. ANN.,
§§ 2:176-32 to -34 (1940); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 1914; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN., §§ 14402 to 405 (1943) ; N.D. REV. CODE, § 62-0109 (1943) (requiring license to carry to

purchase firearm).
39. TEx. PENAL
(1942).

CODE, art. 489a (Vernon,

1925); N.H.

REv. LAws, c.

179, § 7

40. Imlay, Uniform FirearmsAct Reaffirmed, 16 A.B.A.J. 799, 800 (1930).
41. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 14, §§ 172-186 (1940) ; D.C. CODE §§ 22-3201 to 22-3216
(1940) ; IND. ANN. STAT., §§ 10-4734 to 4747 (Burns, 1933) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18,
§ 4628 (Purdon, 1945). S.D. CODE, §§ 21.0101 to 21.0114 (1939) ; WASH. REv. STAT.
ANN., §§ 2516-1-20 (Supp. 1940).
42. § 11, 9 UNrFoRm LAws ANN. 585 (1942).
43. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah,
Virginia, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
44. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 14, §§ 181, 182 (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4158
(1949); D.C. CODE, §§ 22-3209-32010 (1940); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-4741-4742
(Burns, 1933) ; IowA CODE, §§ 695.19-695.20 (1946) ; N.H. REv. LAWS, c. 179, §§ 8-10
(1942); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 1914; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, §§ 4628(i) (j) (1945);
S.D. CODE, §§ 21.0110-.0111 (1939) ; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN., §§ 2516-10, 11 (Supp.
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or to pay a special tax as a prerequisite to doing business.45 Generally only
retail dealers are required to obtain a license, but in at least two states
47
jobbers are regulated,46 and in one state manufacturers must register.
The license requirements vary greatly, sometimes regulating the character
of the place of business, display, and advertising, 48 and usually requiring the
seller to keep a record available for inspection by law enforcement officers. 49
The Uniform Firearms Act, adopted by five states and the District of
Columbia, represents probably the best existing legislation on the regulation
of the actual transaction of sale. 50 It provides:
"No seller shall deliver a pistol to a purchaser until forty-eight
hours has elapsed from the time of application for purchase." 5t
Effective as a cooling-off period for those who might commit some act of
violence in the heat of passion, if a firearm were obtainable, this provision
also serves as a period in which the retailer may try to check on the
identity of the purchaser and the truth of the statements in the application.
The law also provides for prompt delivery of the application to the local
police, so that they may have an opportunity to investigate the purchaser.
A longer period would seem desirable to give the police an opportunity to
investigate through all possible channels the advisability of permitting the
purchaser to complete the purchase and to gain possession of a firearm.
"When delivered the firearm must be unloaded and securely
wrapped." 52
Except to prevent accidents and to satisfy various state requirements as
to carrying a pistol without a license, this provision is not of importance.
1940); W. VA. CODE ANN., § 6051 (1949); cf. N.D. REV. CODE, §§ 62-0113 to 0115
(1943) ; ORE. ComP. LAws ANN., §§ 25-119 to 122 (1940) (both giving cities and
towns right to regulate dealers in accordance with statutory regulations). Two states
allow the sale of only Army and Navy pistols, see note 56 infra. One state does not
allow the sale of firearms, see note 55 infra.
45. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 7047d (Vernon, 1925) ; VA. APPEND. TO TAX
CODE, § 194 (1942) ; W. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 6051, 889 (1949).
46. DEL. REV. CODE, §§ 197, 231 (1935), amended by, Del. Laws 1939, c. 71,
§ 232-198; MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 140, §§ 122-128 (1933).
47. Nj. STAT. ANN., §§2:176-3 (1940).
48. MASS. ANN. LAwS, c. 140, §§ 122-128 (1933).
49. See note 44 supra; CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 1970, § 9 (Supp. 1947); COLO.
STAT. ANN., c. 68, § 3 (1935); ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 38, § 153 (1935); ME. Rxv.
STAT. c. 131, § 13 (1944); MIcH. STAT. ANN., § 28.429 (Henderson, 1938); Miss.
CODE ANN., § 2082 (1942), amended by Miss. CODE ANN., § 8625 (Supp. 1946);
Mo. REv. STAT. ANN., § 4423 (1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 14-406 (1943);
R.I. GEN. LAWS, c. 405, §§ 1,2 (1938); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN., art. 489a (Vernon,
1925); WYo. Comp. STAT. ANN., §§ 9-1207-1210 (1945).
Illinois, Missouri, and

West Virginia require dealers to keep records of all firearms in their possession.
50. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 14, § 179 (1940); D.C. CoDE, §§ 22-3208 (1940); IND.
ANN. STAT., § 10-4740 (Burns, 1933); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4628 (h) (Purdon,
1945); S.D. CODE, § 21.0109 (1939); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN., § 2516-9 (Supp.
1940).
51. In addition to those states in note 50 supra: CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 1970, § 10
(1944); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 4164 (1949); MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 140, § 123
(1933); N.D. REV. CODE, § 62-0109 (1943); ORE. COmP. LAWS, § 25-119 (Supp.
1943). N.J. STAT. ANN., § 2:176-36 (1940) (seven days); TEx. PENAL CODE, Art.
489a (Vernon, 1925) (no sale to person in heat of passion).
52. In addition to those states in note 50 supra: CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 1970, § 10
(1944); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV., §4164 (1949); N.J. STAT. ANN., §2:176-27
(1940); N.D. REV. CODE, §62-0109 (1943); ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN., §25-119
(1941).

1950]

NOTES

There is nothing to prevent the purchaser from unwrapping and loading
the gun as soon as it has been handed to him.
"At time of applying for purchase of a pistol, purchaser shall sign
in triplicate and deliver to the seller a statement containing his full
name and address, occupation, place of birth, date and time of application, calibre, make, model and manufacturer's serial number and a
statement that he has never been convicted of a crime. The seller shall
forward signed with his address attached one copy to the law enforcement agency in the county or city of which he is resident, by registered
mail, within six hours, forward a duplicate within seven days to the
designated state official and retain the triplicate himself for six
years." 6
This provision serves a threefold purpose. It protects the seller by furnishing him with a record and shifting the responsibility for statements made
to the purchaser. It furnishes local officials with notice and opportunity
to investigate before the firearm is delivered. Finally it provides both state
and local officials with a record of purchases, which aids in tracing weapons
stolen or used in criminal acts, and discourages those on the criminal fringe,
who are unable to obtain weapons through underworld channels.
The majority of the states have not gone so far as the Uniform Act,
and require only that some record be kept by the seller.5 4 South Carolina,
on the other hand, completely prohibits the sale of firearms, 55 while
Arkansas and Tennessee restrict sales to army and navy weapons, the
exception being based on decisions that such weapons are necessary to the
defense of the country, so that their sale cannot be prohibited constitutionally. 6
Pledging of Firearns.-Boththe Uniform Firearms Act and the Uni57
form Pistol Act forbid the transfer of firearms as security, for loans,
while the Federal Firearms Act forbids the pledging of any firearm known
to have been stolen which has been shipped in interstate commerce.58 Experience has shown that "pawnshops" are one of the chief suppliers of
firearms to members of the underworld, and a means of disposing of stolen
firearms with little or no danger to the thief.5 9 Reputable pawnbrokers'
associations have realized that this trade jeopardizes their business and
community standing and have cooperated in getting state legislatures to
pass regulatory statutes. At the present time a large number, although
not a majority, of the states have such legislation; those who have not are
53. See note 49 supra for states requiring record of purchase. In addition to
states in note 50 supra, the following require that the police authorities be notified
of purchase: CAL. GEN. LAws, Act 1970, § 9 (Supp. 1947); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv., § 4164 (1949); IowA CODE, § 695.21 (1946) (report to county recorder);
MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 140, § 123 (1933); MICH. STAT. ANN., § 28.92 (Henderson,
Supp. 1949); Mo. Rv. STAT. ANN., § 4826 (1939); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 179, § 9

(1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. $2:176-38 (1940): N.Y. PENAL CODE. §1914(6). N.D.
REv. CODE, §62-0114(c) (1943); ORE. Comp. LAws ANN., §25-119 (1940); W. VA.
CODE ANN., § 6051 (1949).
54. See notes 44 and 49 supra.

55. S.C. CODE ANN., § 1255 (1942).
56. ARE:. STAT. ANN., § 41-4502 (1947); TENN. CODE ANN., § 11009 (Williams,

1943) (both excepting army and navy pistols) construed in State v. Ring, 77 Ark.
139, 91 S.W. 11 (1905); Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk 165 (Tenn. 1871).
57. UNIFORM FIREARMS ACT § 12; UNIFORM PISTOL ACT § 14.
58. STAT. 15 U.S.C. §902(h) (1948).
59. Barber-Smith, FirearmsRegulation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 400 (1934).
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either chiefly rural with few pawnbrokers, or states in which the pawnbrokers themselves have not favored the enactment.
Alteration of Serial Numbers.-Most states require that all firearms
have a serial number and make it a crime for anyone to obliterate or change
it.6 0 In the present state of scientific crime detection, laboratory technicians
of well-equipped local police forces or the Federal Bureau of Investigation
can restore any but the most thoroughly removed serial numbers. 6 ' Furthermore, many manufacturers place serial numbers on various parts of the
firearm, some hard to find and others in places where the removal of any
great amount of metal would render the weapon valueless. Nevertheless,
too great dependence should not be placed on serial numbers as a means
of firearm identification, since it is not unusual to find the same make and
model with similar serial numbers, especially where European arms are
involved.62 A presumption that the possessor of a weapon from which
the serial number has been removed is the person who has removed it is
usually created by the statute.6 3 This is valuable in reducing the saleability
of such weapons, and forcing the possessor to prove his lack of criminal
intent in acquiring the weapon.
Machine Gun Acts.-The "tommy-gun" has become, following the
notorious careers of such criminals as Machine-gun Kelley, Pretty-boy
64
In the late
Floyd, and Dillinger, the symbol of organized gangsterism.

twenties and early thirties it was an indispensable weapon of the professional killer in battles with rival gangs and law enforcement officers. The
sub-machine gun became so great a menace to law enforcement that special
65
statutes were passed by many states in an attempt to stamp out its use,
66
and the campaign, aided by the National Firearms Act, has been so successful that these weapons have virtually disappeared from the public scene.
60. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 14, § 184 (1940); CAL GEN. LAWS, Act 1790, § 13
(Supp. 1947) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 4167 (1949) ; D.C. CODE, § 22-3212 (1940) ;

38, § 143a (1935); IND. ANN. STAT., § 10-4745 (Burns, 1933);
c. 269, § 11B (Supp. 1948); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN., § 4827
(1939); N.H. REV. LAWS, C. 179, § 13 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN., § 2:176-15 (1940);
N.Y. PENAL CODE, §1897(6); N.D. REV. CODE, §62-0117 (1943); ORE. CoMP.
LAWS ANN., § 25-123 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4628 (n) (Purdon 1945);
S.D. CODE, §21.0114 (1939); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN., § 14 (Supp. 1940).
61. HATCHER, FIREARMS INVESTIGATION, IDENTIFICATION AND EVIDENCE 135-142
(1935).
62. See note 61 supra.
63. See text at note 71 infra.
64. JOHNSON AND HAVEN, AUTOmATIC ARsS 59, 60 (1941). See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 9066, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 151-161
(1933).
IL.

ANN. STAT., c.
LAws,

MASS. ANN.

65. In addition to those states which have adopted the Uniform Machine Gun

Act, the following states have provisions covering machine guns: CAL. GEN. LAWS
act 1971, § 1 et seq. (1944) ; DEL. REV. CODE, § 5289 (1935) ; D.C. CODE, § 22-3201
to 3216 (1940); FLA. STAT., §§ 790.01, .16 (1941); GA. LAWS, 1935, c. 397; ILL.
STAT. ANN., c. 38, § 414 (1935); IND. STAT. ANN., §§ 10-4712, 4713 (Burns, 1933),
10-4714 (Supp. 1949); IOWA CODE, § 696.2, 6-8 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.,
§§21-2601 to 2607 (1935) ; MASS. ANN. LAws, c. 140, § 123 (1933), c. 269, § 10
(Supp. 1949); Mo. REV. STAT., §§ 4819, 4820 (1939); NEB. REV. STAT., 8§ 28-1010,
1011 (1943); N.J. STAT. ANN., §§2:176-49 to 54 (1940); N.Y. PENA. LAW,
1897(la); N.C. GEN. STAT., § 14-409 (1943); N.D. REV. CODE, §§62-0201 to 0205
(1943); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN., §§ 12819-3 to 7 (1938); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN.,
§ 25-115 (Supp. 1943) ; PA. STAT. ANN.. tit. 18, §§ 4103, 4629. 4630 (Purdon, 1945) ;
R. I. GEN. LAWS, c. 404, §§ 1, 2, 4, 7 (1938) ; S.C. CODE, § 1258-1 (1942) ; TEx. PEN.
CODE, ANN., art. 489(b) (Vernon 1925); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN., §§ 2518-1 to
4 (Supp. 1940); W. VA. CODE ANN., § 6050 (1949).
66. 26 U.S.C. §§2720-2733, §§ 3260-3266 (1948).
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The machine gun itself has never been a popular criminal weapon, since
it is very bulky, requires a large amount of ammunition, and is not sufficiently mobile to answer the purposes of most criminal gangs. It is possible that semi-automatic weapons may also be converted into fully automatic ones, 67 and while such weapons should not be barred because of this
potentiality, any anti-machine gun statute should be drawn to deal with
such altered weapons.
Of the various anti-machine gun statutes, the Uniform Machine Gun
Act is probably most complete.68 Especially noteworthy are the presumptions of possession and use for an aggressive purpose when: (a) the
machine gun is on premises not owned or bona fide used by the person in
whose possession found; (b) possession or use by an alien or one convicted
of a crime of violence; (c) not registered; (d) when shells cal. .30 or
larger used or unused are found in the immediate vicinity thereof. 69 A
presumption of possession by the person occupying also arises when a machine gun is found in a room, boat or vehicle. 70 The 'severity of such a
statute is justified by the potential danger fom such weapons. All constitutional measures should be taken to deprive the criminal of their use.
Presimptions.-Presumptionsmust be liberally incorporated into firearms statutes if they are to be of practical value in the prosecution of violators, but careful drafting and interpretation are imperative to avoid constitutional objections or injustices.
The presumption which makes possession of a firearm from which the
serial numbers have been removed or altered prima facie evidence that the
possessor is responsible for the alteration or removal has been already
referred to. 71 Although its constitutionality has not yet been tested, the
inference that the possessor has removed the serial numbers would appear
to be reasonable, since purchase of such a weapon would be impossible from
a reputable dealer, and the mutilated condition of the firearm would make
purchase from an honest citizen unlikely. In such a situation, it would not
seem to be a lack of due process to place the burden of proof on the accused.
Another presumption in general use makes the presence of a pistol in
an automobile presumptive evidence of its illegal possessio4 by all in the
car.72 This is the result of unhappy experience with statutes which merely
prohibit carrying a firearm concealed on the person: criminals apprehended
while in an automobile adopted the practice of dropping their weapons to
the floor and swearing ignorance of how they got there. A New York
decision, however, denying the existence of sufficient rational connection
between the known fact-the presence of the illegal firearm in the carand the fact sought to be proven-the knowledge by all persons in the car
67. Several types of semi-automatic weapons may be converted into fully automatic weapons. A case in point is the U.S. Carbine, caliber .30 M-1, converted
from a semi-automatic to a fully automatic weapon by the Ordnance Department
during World War II.
68. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., 433 (1942); adopted as ARK. STAT. ANN., tit. 41,

§8 41-4507 to 4517 (1947) : CONN. GEN. STAT. REV., § 8509 (1949) : MD. ANN. CODE,
GEN. LAws. Art. 27, §§ 421-32 (1939); MONT. REV. CODE ANN., §§ 94-3101 to 3111
(1947): S.D. CODE. §§ 21.0201 to 21.0209 (1939); VA. CODE ANN., §§ 18-135 to
145 (1950); Wis. STAT., §§ 164.01-164.20 (1947).
69. UNIFORM MACHINE GUN AcT § 4.

70. UNIFORM MACHINE GUN AcT § 5.
71. UNIFORM FIREARMS Act § 14; UNIFORM PISTOL AcT § 16.
72. UNIFORM PISTOL AcT § 3. This section was based on CONN. GEN. STAT.

REV. §4168 (1949);
§1898(a).

N.J. STAT. ANN.,

§2:176-7 (1940);

N.Y. PENAL. CODE,
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that the weapon was there-leaves the constitutionality of this presumption
in doubt. 73 Some state courts have reached the same result by stretching
that a firearm within a car is concealed
the concealed weapons law to mean
74
within the meaning of the statute.
By a conclusive presumption, arrest of one actually in illegal possession of a firearm is made lawful, even when the arresting officer does not
actually have reasonable grounds for arrest at the time it is made. 75 This
rule is useful where, by state law, evidence obtained by illegal arrest is
inadmissible.7 6 Although it would seem to be an evasion of the prohibition
against unlawful seizure, the presumption has not yet been challenged on
constitutional grounds. An allied rule, where search and lawful arrest for
unlawfully carrying a pistol are part of the same transaction, makes it conclusively presumed that arrest was first.7 7 This allows evidence so obtained
to be admitted in a prosecution for unlawfully carrying a firearm. Again
the same possible constitutional objections apply. Several courts, however,
before arrest as a precautionary measure, without
have sanctioned search
78
benefit of statute.
One other presumption deserves mention. Section 3 of the Uniform
Firearms Act provides: "In the trial of a person for committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence the fact that he was armed with a
pistol and had no license to carry the same shall be prima facie evidence
of his intention to commit said crime of violence." This provision has been
held unconstitutional as a violation of due process, on the ground that
there is no rational connection between the fact proved and that sought to
be proved, in California and Indiana, the only states in which it has been
challenged. 79
Penalties.-Both the Uniform Pistol Act and the Uniform Firearms
Act attempt to use additional penalties as a deterrent to the use of firearms
in the commission of crimes.80 When a firearm is used in the commission
of a crime, parole or probation may also be denied for a specified period
to any person previously convicted of specified crimes. 81 These provisions
might prove effective where crimes such as robbery, burglary or rape are
concerned, and certainly would make a firearm too expensive a luxury for
the petty criminal. Although such penalties may not deter the hardened
criminal, they will impress young hoodlums, who are the ones most likely
73. 249 App. Div. 464, 293 N.Y.S. 191 (3d (Dep't. 1937) held unconstitutional,
but dismissed on other grounds on appeal. See also Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463 (1943).
74. E.g., Schraeder v. State, 28 Ohio App. 248, 163 N.E. 647 (1928) ; Wagner
v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. Rep. 66, 188 S.W. 1001 (1916).
75. UNIFORm PISTOL ACT § 4, e.g., MONT. REv. CODE ANN., § 11305 (1935);

TEx.

PENAL CODE ANN., Art. 487 (Vernon, 1925).

76. Bruce and Rosemarin, The Gunman and His Gun, 24 J. CRIm. L. 521, 543
(1934).
77. UNIFORM PISTOL ACT § 5. E.g., DEL. REV. CODE, § 5286 (1935).
78. Ingle v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 518, 264 S.W. 1088 (1924); State v.
McDaniel, 115 Ore. 187, 237 Pac. 373 (1925).
79. People v. Murguia, 6 Cal.2d 190, 57 P.2d 115 (1936); Everett v. State,
208 Ind. 145, 195 N.E. 77 (1935).
80. UNIFORM% FIREARMS ACT § 2; UNIFORM

PISTOL ACT § 2.

81. Section 2 of the Uniform Firearms Act provides only for an added penalty,
while Section 2 of the Uniform Pistol Act provides that at least two and one-half
years shall be served before probation or parole. Since the crimes enumerated carry
a maximum penalty of more than two and one-half years in nearly all states, the result
is to suspend parole or probation for at least that period.
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to shoot their victims under the stress of8 2circumstances. Unfortunately,
they have been adopted in very few states.
Many statutes provide for the confiscation of firearms of offenders,
most states destroying them,8 3 while a few keep usable weapons for state
and local law enforcement officers.8 4 A very few sell at public auction the
confiscated weapons that are usable, placing the funds either to the credit
of the agency seizing the offender or some other general state fund. 85 This
latter plan seems best, since the weapons may serve to outfit hunters and
sportsmen at small cost. Surely the state is not taking revenge on the
weapon for its owner's misdeeds! It would be proper for the state to set
up a plan whereby usable weapons went first to state and local law enforcement 6fficers that needed them, next to state colleges and high school pistol
and rifle teams, and the remainder to be sold at public auction.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION

National FirearmsAct.-The first federal firearms act attempting to
comdeal with the problem of the transportation of firearms in interstate
86
The
merce, passed in 1927, prohibited the shipment of firearms by mail.
statute is noteworthy only for its failure, since it merely changed the manner of transportation without affecting the trade in any other way. Prior
to 1934 various bills were proposed in the House and Senate to regulate
firearms, either under the interstate commerce clause or by use of the taxing power.8 7 These culminated in the National Firearms Act in 1934.88
As originally drafted, the law taxed sales by individuals, and regulated the
carrying of weapons across state lines.89 Additionally, a formidable task
of record keeping was created for the taxing agency. Included in the bill's
coverage were revolvers and pistols. These features of the bill met strong
organized opposition from sportsmen and rifle associations, with the result
that reference to pistols and revolvers was deleted, and a pure revenue
measure, on its face, enacted.
In its present form, the National Firearms Act is based entirely on
the power of Congress to levy and collect taxes. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is constituted the regulating authority, and he in turn
has placed the Alcohol Tax Unit in charge of administering and enforcing
the Act.90 Its coverage is limited to machine guns, rifles and shotguns
with barrels less than eighteen inches in length, and silencers, on which a
tax of two hundred dollars is levied for each transfer. Export and import
are also regulated, dealers taxed annually two hundred, pawnbrokers three
hundred and manufacturers five hundred dollars, and penalties provided.
82. See note 41 supra. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., C. 38, § 157 (1935) ; MINN. STAT.,
§610.18 (Henderson, 1945).
83. CAL. GEN. LAws, Act 1970, §§ 3, 4 (1944); N.Y. PENAL CODE, § 1899.
84. E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, §245 (1935); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN.,
§ 25-101 (Supp. 1943).
85. E.g., FLA. STAT., § 790.08 (Supp. 1945); TENN. CODE ANN., § 11018
(Williams, 1934); MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 269, § 10 (Supp. 1949); S.C. CODE ANN.,
§ 1257 (1942).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1948).
87. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce on S. 885,

S. 2258, S. 3680, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 3026 (1934).
88. 114 26 U.S.C. §§ 2720-2733 and §§3260-3266 (1948).

89. Hearings before tte Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 9066, 73d

Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
90. 26 CODE FED. REGS. § 319 (1941).
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Registration is required of all weapons not transferred in conformity
with the Act, and severe penalties provided for failure to register. Since
criminals cannot obtain weapons in conformity with the Act, and dare not
register, this provides a stiff federal sanction against them. It is apparent
that the weapons covered are those most favored by criminals, automatic
weapons, the "sawed-off" variety, and silencers.
The constitutionality of the National Firearms Act as a taxing measure
was sustained by the Supreme Court in Sonzinsky v. United States,9 1 on
the ground that since it was prima facie productive of some revenue, the
court would not go behind the Act and inquire into the motives of Congress
in enacting it. Similarly, the portion of the Act dealing with interstate
transportation of unregistered firearms was sustained in United States v.
92
Miller.
The Act may yet be needed. Although the types of weapons covered
are not much used by criminals now, veteran law enforcement officers fear
that in time the large number of automatic weapons brought home by re93
turning servicemen will filter from reputable hands into the underworld.
Federal FirearmsAct.-In 1938 Congress enacted the Federal Firearms Act, which regulates the movement in interstate commerce of all
firearms and ammunition larger than .22 calibre.9 4 In addition to licensing
all dealers, the Act prohibits shipment to criminals or receipt by criminals,
and also the movement of stolen weapons. Its purpose is to aid state authorities in enforcing state laws by prohibiting the movement of weapons
across state line for criminal activities.
In Tot v. United States,9 5 a presumption embodied in the Act, whereby
possession of firearms or ammunition by a convicted felon was made evidence of receipt in violation of the Act, was held unconstitutional. The
remainder of the Act was, however, not stricken down.
More recently, these Acts have been implemented by passage of a
statute making it unlawful to use any vessel, vehicle or aircraft in the transportation, concealment, possession, purchase or sale of contraband, including "any firearm, with respect to which there has been committed any violation of the National Firearms Act". 6 A penalty of seizure and forfeiture
of the vessel, vehicles or aircraft used is provided.
CONCLUSION
State firearms legislation has been plagued by the consequences of lack
of uniformity, e.g., interstate sale and transportation of weapons with
criminal intent, and burdens on interstate travellers innocently carrying
firearms. Differing social and economic conditions among the states may
render complete uniformity undesirable, but substantial agreement on major
points should nevertheless be striven for. Although most states have not
adopted the various Uniform Acts recommended by the National Con91. 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
92. 307 U.S. 114 (1939).
93. To handle this situation, a War Trophies Committee, consisting of representatives of the War and Navy Departments, the Treasury, and the National Rifle
Association was formed. The War and Navy Departments furnish men and equipment to deactivate explosives and other trophies; the Treasury registers weapons
coming under the National Firearms Act; the National Rifle Association advises
owners of firearms who wish to use them, as to the condition of the weapons and the
repairs necessary to make them safe for use.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§901-909 (1948).
95. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
96. 49 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1948).
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ference of Commissioners on Uniform Acts, it is to be hoped that law enforcement conferences may achieve resolutions to press for the enactment
of particular provisions by the participating states. One should not overlook the possibility that uniformity may be forced upon the states by federal
regulation, in spite of apparent constitutional objections.
It is submitted that uniformity should include the following provisions:
1. Statutory application of the law of the domicile to interstate travellers innocently carrying weapons.
2. Dual licensing: a special, easily procured license for targetshooters
and sportsmen; and a general license with more rigid standards for others.
3. Administration of licensing by a specialized unit, with local
branches, capable of making a thorough investigation of the applicant and
required by law to follow a procedure designed to safeguard applicants'
rights, including judicial review.
4. Provision of additional penalties for armed criminal activities.
5. A file of stolen weapons at a central location, preferably on a national scale. The federal government may be the best authority to furnish
such facilities. National registration of all weapons is however, not to be
desired.
6. Presumptions of illegal possession of firearms where constitutionally permissible, when a rational inference may be drawn from the known
facts, and known criminals are involved.
In general national welfare will be promoted by the encouragement of
citizen training programs in the use of firearms, following the example of
such organizations as the National Rifle Association, to develop a military
asset, to help private persons to protect themselves against robbery and
burglary, and to provide healthy recreation.
F.J.K.

